I don't think people are appreciating what this actually means. Essentially, it means that you cannot be fined or have property taken away from you as it would be illegal to do so without first having been convicted within a court of law. In the Governements eagerness to automate fine collecting they 'overlooked' what is a constitutional statute. It cannot be repealed unless the Government essentially say it was wrong for the bill of rights to be drawn in the first place. The constitutional backlashing that this Government could take if they attempted to repeal it in any way would be massive. The only option for them is to set precident in the courts.
The basic tenets of the Bill of Rights 1689 are:
Englishmen, as embodied by Parliament, possessed certain civil and political rights that could not be taken away. These included:
freedom from royal interference with the law (the Sovereign was forbidden to establish his own courts or to act as a judge himself)
freedom from taxation by royal prerogative, without agreement by Parliament
freedom to petition the king
freedom from a peace-time standing army, without agreement by Parliament
freedom [for Protestants] to bear arms for self-defence, as allowed by law
freedom to elect members of Parliament without interference from the Sovereign
the freedom of speech in Parliament, in that proceedings in Parliament were not to be questioned in the courts or in any body outside Parliament itself (the basis of modern parliamentary privilege)
freedom from cruel and unusual punishments, and excessive bail
freedom from fines and forfeitures without trial
.
taken from
http://www.gunowners.org/op9706.htm
Faced with embarrassment, the government might rely on the doctrine that no parliament may be bound by its predecessors, and seek if necessary to repeal the provisions of the Bill of Rights. But in so doing they must attack the principle of the Bill: for the Bill of Rights claimed not to promulgate anything new, but rather to reaffirm the "true antient and indubitable rights and liberties of the people of this Kingdom" that should be upheld "in all times to come". Against this the government must set the view of parliamentary sovereignty expressed most eloquently by Dicey a century ago, that would allow them to "make or unmake any law whatever". (10) Dicey denied that "constitutional" laws were special; (11) though interestingly his illustration of this looked at the Acts of Union rather than the Bill of Rights, (12) and since he wrote, we have seen parliament once again accept the notion of higher law. The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy has, indeed, had a chequered history. Sixty years before the Bill of Rights, the doctrine was affirmed (not without political motivation) by Sir Edward Coke, who declared that the power of parliament "cannot be confined" and recorded the failures of the attempts of earlier parliaments to bind their successors. (13) This did not deter parliament in 1689 from enacting the Bill of Rights, any more than the doctrine enunciated by Dicey prevented parliament binding its successors under Section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972. (14) Perhaps, in the unlikely event that the European Union survives for the next three hundred years and its rulings do not in the meantime conflict with UK law, a future constitutional lawyer will once again assert the absolute supremacy of parliament, because it has not been tested. The situation might then be analogous with the Bill of Rights now: for though the Bill has been revised in matters of procedure, the thirteen essential principles of the Declaration of Rights that were supposed to be upheld "for all time to come" still stand.
The question whether parliament can now override the Bill of Rights, is at once the question whether it is proper for it to do so. The Bill of Rights set out the claims of parliament as part of the constitutional framework of legitimate rule, in ignoring which it declared that Restoration governments had acted unlawfully. The twin pillars of that framework were the old principle of government by common counsel, in which our notion of parliamentary sovereignty is founded; and the ancient yardstick of custom, in which our notion of precedent, and therewith of the rule of law, is rooted. These enduring constitutional precepts were not merely the whim of 1689.